Now for part II of our exciting look at the Washington Consensus
Week 5 : The Washington Consensus in Action
After seeing off the Latin American crisis the IMF was armed with a new ideology and a one size fits all solution to future crises. In retrospect this should have been alarming, but convergence was the order of the day - if all economies could be made like those of the capitalist west we'd be fine. Sadly the IMF was then presented with a succession of opportunities to demonstrate how not to do it in Russia, East Asia and Africa. I'm going to focus on East Asia here...
In 1997 the Thai Baht was hit by currency speculation and it collapsed. Fear of contagion saw neighbouring currencies start to go the same way as hot money made a 'flight to quality'. (sell Baht, buy $$$). Once again there was the danger that countries with weak currencies would not be able to meet their debts to the west. Enter the IMF.
IMF treatment consisted of short term loans tied to implementation of the Washington Consesus. Governments were told to cut spending and raise taxes. In Indonesia a requirement to cut spending on welfare payments sparked riots and led to deaths - that was reversed shortly afterwards but the cut in investment had long term consequences for the economy.
The IMF considered that it had 'all areas' access to creditor states policy and told the Koreans to dismantle excess capacity in their semi-conductor industry. The Koreans refused arguing that the downturn in semi-conductors was cyclical. Quite why the IMF thought they knew more about the semi-conductor industry than the Koreans is open to debate, in any event the Koreans were proved right and their semi-conductor industry proved vital in leading them out of recession.
Elsewhere the IMF demanded market liberalisation and an end to anything that looked like capital controls. Malaysia refused to go along with this and came through the crisis much better than anywhere else. In Korea long term investment barely dropped despite the crisis, all the damage was being done by 'hot money', capital controls may have forced investors to keep their money wwhere it was and seen off the crisis. This was exactly the kind of thing Keynes had intended when the IMF was set up, but to todays IMF it's anathema.
In Korea problems were caused by market liberalisation. Korea had been pushed into opening it's markets to global capital before they were ready to deal with it. Hence all the problems with Korean banks not being up to scratch and the resulting crisis of confidence. Had the policy been to open Korea up gradually and introduce banking reform / strong institutions as they went this mess might have been avoidable.
The response to this and other problems with the Washington Consensus has been as follows.
1. Sequencing - you have to do things in the right order. Such as not privatising state monopolies before you've got rules to regulate them (Russia)
2. Capital Account Liberalisation - now this should only be attempted in the presence of strong institutions
3. Soverign Debt Workout - a proposal that the IMF should be able to sit down with govts and creditors to restructure their debt. Oddly enough commercial interests are blocking this one.
4. Capital controls - suggestions that these might work after all have sparked *open disagreement* (unheard of in the IMF)
5. Don't mess with what you don't understand - IMF turned out to make a lousy aid agency in Africa
Stiglitz suggests that the culture of the IMF as an institution may be as much at fault as it's economics. IMF economists are not specialists on the countries they're sent to. Rather they're despatched to solve crises at short notice and arrive bearing a briefcase of standard prescriptions. The prevailing attitude is that if the problem state was any good at economics it wouldn't be in the mess it is.
It's worth mentioning what the world bank was doing during all of this. In Africa it's had a much better record since it stopped lending to dictators. In Russia it ran into problems because although it had plenty of money to lend Russia Russia was not well set up to spend it. Russia already had schools, universities, roads and factories and didn't really need more. It also had hyperinflation, inadequate institutions and a massive insurgence of organised crime, but the bank couldn't do much about that. In Asia the bank got caught up in the IMF lending to sustain the currencies that were under pressure from speculators. The immediate result was that the bank, IMF and assorted governments discovered that speculators have an incredible amount of money and can suck up as much as the bank can give out.